Free Speech: Federal Law Criminalizing Depictions of Animal Cruelty Declared Unconstitutional
By: Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair
There are times when the U.S. Constitution protects human activity that is repugnant and seemingly socially irredeemable. The U.S. Supreme Court recently handed down a ruling in the case of Robert J. Stevens who was convicted under a federal statute titled 18 U.S.C. Sec. 48 which prohibits the “depiction of animal cruelty.” This statute was enacted by Congress to, as the Supreme Court said, “criminalize the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depiction of animal cruelty.”
Robert Stevens operated a business called “Dogs of Velvet and Steel” in Pittsville, Virginia. Through an associated website, he sold videos depicting pit bulls fighting each other or attacking other animals. Two of the videos, “Japan Pit Fights” and “Pick-A-Winna: A Pit Bull Documentary,” depicted pit bull fighting in Japan (a legal activity in that country) and pit bull fights in this country from the 1960s and ‘70s. A third video sold by Stevens was titled “Catch Dogs and Country Living.” This particular video was particularly gruesome, depicting pit bulls hunting wild boar and a dog attacking a domestic farm pig.
On the basis of these three videos, Steven was indicted by a federal grand jury for violating Sec. 48. A jury convicted him on three counts and he was sentenced to three concurrent 37-month prison terms followed by three concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. In a pretrial motion Stevens sought to have the Sec. 48 indictment against him dismissed on the basis of a “free speech” challenge under the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, pointing out that the depiction of animal cruelty, like child pornography and obscenity, did not enjoy First Amendment protection.
An en banc Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, however, found Sec. 48 “facially unconstitutional” and reversed Stevens’ convictions. The appeals court essentially said that Sec. 48 was an attempt to regulate speech, adding that the court was not prepared create a “new category of unprotected speech” for cruelty to animals. The constitutional underpinnings of the Third Circuit’s rationale was that Sec. 48 did not serve any “compelling government interest” because the statute was not tailored to prevent animal cruelty, or, at the very least, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing that objective.


