CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal Law Blog by Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

February 21, 2009

SENTENCING DEPARTURES SINCE BOOKER

Filed under: federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 4:52 pm

Defense Lawyers Must Prepare for Federal Sentencing

By: Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The United States Supreme Court in 1996 held that federal district court judges had discretion to depart from the recommendations of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See: Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 91, 98 (1996).

Some of these judges – many of whom were placed on the federal bench during the 12-year presidential reign of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush because they shared the politically conservative views of judges like Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas – viewed Koon as a judicial license to enhance criminal sentences as part of the Republicans’ “war on crime.” See: United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 346 (2nd Cir. 2005) [reversal of a district court judge’s sentence based upon multiple enhancements including a 13-level increase in the offense level and a three-level increase in the criminal history level].

Nine years after Koon – a case involving one of the Los Angeles police officers convicted in the infamous “Rodney King” freeway beating – the Supreme Court handed down United States v. Booker which limited the discretion of federal judges to enhance sentences by ruling that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. See: 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).

Booker instructed federal judges that in sentencing matters they could only consider facts for enhancement that are: (1) reflected in the jury verdict; (2) admitted by the defendant; (3) contained in the defendant’s guilty plea; or (4) pertain to a prior conviction. Id. Beyond these factors, the jury had to find facts true beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant enhancement. Id.

Two terms later the Supreme Court reinforced Booker with two strong sentencing decisions. First, in Rita v. United States the court held that any sentence imposed consistent with the Booker rule had to be presumed “reasonable” when reviewed on appeal by the federal appellate courts. See: 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007). (more…)

December 12, 2008

PROBATION ELIGIBILITY: NEW LIMITATIONS

Texas Juries Can No Longer Recommend Community Supervision When Victim is Child Under 15, Elderly or Disabled

By: Houston Criminal Defense Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Community supervision, or probation as most people know it, has been defined by federal courts as an “imprisonment substitute” because the criminal sentence is not served in a penal institution. See: United States v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1999).

In the State of Texas community supervision is a privilege, not a right. See: Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050 (1996). It is a punishment alternative that must either be agreed to between the state and defendant, ordered by a judge or recommended by a jury.

The Flores court specifically stated that “there is no fundamental right to receive probation [community supervision]; it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether an individual is entitled to probation.” Id.

In Texas, community supervision can be granted either by the trial judge or assessed by the jury. See: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12(3)(a); (4)(d).

While there is no fundamental right to community supervision, § 42.12(3)(a) requires that the judge impose community supervision “in the best interest of justice, the public, and the defendant” – all three of which are legitimate government purposes. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131.

Similarly, in federal court a district judge may depart from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ prison recommendation and impose probation but only after he/she has considered all the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3353. See: United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542, 546-47 (2d Cir. 2006).

The discretion of the trial judge in Texas to grant, and the jury’s authority to assess, community supervision are likewise limited by statute. For example, Subsection 3g(a) of § 42.12(3) prohibits the trial judge from granting community supervision: (more…)

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