CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal Law Blog by Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

August 31, 2011

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING?

Filed under: Federal Crimes Lawyer — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 5:16 pm

Tapia v. U.S.: Need for Rehabilitation not Proper Factor in Determining Sentence

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The concept of penal rehabilitation began at the end of the 19th century in this country. Historically criminal sentences in America have been imposed for four reasons: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Although rehabilitation has been a subject of controversy as a reason for punishment, the State of Texas adopted it as a reason to punish through criminal sentencing. The U.S. Congress, however, has long dispensed with rehabilitation as a basis for criminal sentencing in federal courts. This was evidenced by a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Tapia v. United States, which declared that a federal district court judge abused his discretion by lengthening a defendant’s sentence in order to fulfill rehabilitation objectives.

The Tapia decision is indeed significant as is the court’s examination of the history of federal criminal sentencing. The background facts of the case are fairly simple: Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling illegal aliens into the United States. At her sentencing hearing, the judge determined that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines called for a sentence of 41 to 51 months. The judge elected to impose the high end 51-month term because he felt the defendant had a drug problem and he wanted her to spend enough time in the federal prison system to complete a 500 hour drug treatment program called Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP).At Tapia’s sentencing hearing, the judge specifically stated:

“The sentence has to be sufficient to provide needed correctional treatment, and here I think the needed correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program … Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am going to impose a 51-month sentence … and one of the factors that affects this is the need to provide treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.”

While the judge said he was imposing the maximum recommended term “to deter her from committing other criminal offenses,” he strongly recommended to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons that Tapia “participate in [RDAP] and that she serve her sentence at” the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California where “they have the appropriate tools to help her, to start to make a recovery.”

(more…)

March 8, 2011

5C12-SAFETY VALVE-ANOTHER FAILED SENTENCING REFORM EFFORT

Filed under: Federal Defense Attorney — Tags: , , , , , , — johntfloyd @ 6:42 am

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory Minimums, Safety Valve Encourage Snitches, Promote False Testimony, Prevent Just Sentences

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Anytime a new penal statute uses the term “reform” you can take to it the bank that the result will produce just the opposite; that its objective to correct a perceived and politically charged threat will, more than likely than not, harvest a new crop of worse injustices.

Thus is the case with the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), passed with strong bipartisan support during the Reagan presidency after many years of debate and study. The first indicator that the SRA was not about “reform” was that it was born out of the omnibusComprehensive Crime Control Act which was designed to overhaul the federal criminal justice system. Notwithstanding that SRA was the afterbirth of a sweeping congressional effort to “get tough” on crime, proponents of SRA hailed its primary purposes which were: “(1) to establish comprehensive and coordinated statutory authority for sentencing [currently found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553]; (2) to address the seemingly intractable problem of unwarranted sentencing disparity and enhance crime control by creating an independent, expert sentencing commission to devise and update periodically a system of mandatory sentencing guidelines; and (3) principally through the sentencing commission to create a means of assembling and distributing sentencing data, coordinating sentence research and education, and generally advancing the state of knowledge about criminal behavior.”

One of the SRA’s chief sponsors, the late Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, believed the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) the Commission would promulgate would accomplish three primary policy goals: 1) produce just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation; 2) provide certainty and fairness by eliminating the sentencing disparity, which had plagued the federal court system, through individualized sentencing that considered both aggravating and mitigating factors; and 3) enhance the knowledge of human behavior as it pertained to the criminal justice system.

Last year, the Commission issued a report based upon independent analysis and research,Demographic Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices: An Update of the Booker Report’s Multivariate Regression Analysis, which made the following findings:

  • Black male offenders received longer sentences than white male offenders. The differences in the sentence length have steadily increased since Booker [a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision which held the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are “advisory” and not mandatory as they had been uniformly interpreted since SRA’s enactment].
  • Female offenders of all races received shorter sentences than male offenders. The difference in sentence length fluctuated at different rates in the time periods studied for white females, black females, Hispanic females, and “other” female offenders (such as those of Native American, Alaskan Native, and Asian or Pacific Islander origin).
  • Non-citizen offenders received longer sentences than offender who were U.S. citizens. The differences in sentence length have steadily increased since Booker.
  • Offenders with some college education received shorter sentences than offenders with no college education. The differences in sentence length have remained relatively stable across the time periods studied.
  • The data were inconsistent as to the association between an offender’s age and the length of sentence imposed.

(more…)

February 21, 2009

SENTENCING DEPARTURES SINCE BOOKER

Filed under: federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 4:52 pm

Defense Lawyers Must Prepare for Federal Sentencing

By: Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The United States Supreme Court in 1996 held that federal district court judges had discretion to depart from the recommendations of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See: Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 91, 98 (1996).

Some of these judges – many of whom were placed on the federal bench during the 12-year presidential reign of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush because they shared the politically conservative views of judges like Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas – viewed Koon as a judicial license to enhance criminal sentences as part of the Republicans’ “war on crime.” See: United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 346 (2nd Cir. 2005) [reversal of a district court judge’s sentence based upon multiple enhancements including a 13-level increase in the offense level and a three-level increase in the criminal history level].

Nine years after Koon – a case involving one of the Los Angeles police officers convicted in the infamous “Rodney King” freeway beating – the Supreme Court handed down United States v. Booker which limited the discretion of federal judges to enhance sentences by ruling that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. See: 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).

Booker instructed federal judges that in sentencing matters they could only consider facts for enhancement that are: (1) reflected in the jury verdict; (2) admitted by the defendant; (3) contained in the defendant’s guilty plea; or (4) pertain to a prior conviction. Id. Beyond these factors, the jury had to find facts true beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant enhancement. Id.

Two terms later the Supreme Court reinforced Booker with two strong sentencing decisions. First, in Rita v. United States the court held that any sentence imposed consistent with the Booker rule had to be presumed “reasonable” when reviewed on appeal by the federal appellate courts. See: 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007). (more…)

January 30, 2009

JUDICIAL WAR OVER CRACK SENTENCING COMES TO AN END

Filed under: Drug Defense Attorney — Tags: , , , , , — johntfloyd @ 6:45 pm

Moore and Spears: District Courts have Discretion to Reject the 100:1 Crack/Powder Cocaine Ratio

By: Houston Criminal Defense Attorney John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

Last October we posted a blog entitled “The Judicial Wars Invoked by Crack Sentencing” (Oct. 24, 2008). The blog focused on a judicial tiff between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of James Eric Moore. We are pleased to report that the Supreme Court has finally put this issue to bed in two cases this Term.

This judicial controversy actually began on January 12, 2005 when the Supreme Court issued a controversial ruling that federal district courts were not required to impose precise sentences recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See: United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Court said the Guidelines were advisory in nature, and not mandatory sentencing requirements. Id., at 245-46.

As we reported last October, U.S. District Court Judge Linda Reade, Northern District of Iowa, on November 21, 2005, imposed a term of 188 months of confinement and six years of supervised release on James Eric Moore following a jury conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Relying upon the recent Booker decision, Moore asked Judge Reade to impose a sentence below the one recommended by the Guidelines. The judge replied:

“With regard to the crack and power cocaine difference, that is the law. I’m applying the law as it currently stands. If that is going to be changed, that is a congressional matter. Congress is the one who looks at the guidelines and decides whether or not they should be put in—in force … It isn’t the judges. It’s the lawmakers, and I have taken an oath to apply the law, and that’s what I will do in this sentencing.” (more…)

October 25, 2008

THE JUDICIAL WARS INVOKED BY CRACK SENTENCING

Filed under: Drug Defense Attorney, federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , , , — johntfloyd @ 5:24 am

Supreme Court: Federal Judges Have Discretion at Sentencing

By Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, a federal district court judge must consider each of the factors prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing an appropriate criminal sentence. The § 3553 factors are:

  • “Nature and circumstances of the offense” and defendant’s “history and characteristics.” Id., at (a)(1). Under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence the sentencing judge is limited to those facts (1) “reflected in the jury verdict,” (2) admitted by the defendant, (3) contained in defendant’s guilty plea, or (4) reflect prior convictions. See: Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) [facts affecting sentence must be found by a jury].
  • The general purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act. Id., at (a)(2). The purposes of this Act are to have a sentence “(A) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (d) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner …”
  • The types of sentences available. Id., at (a)(3).
  • The policy statements of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Id., at (a)(5).
  • The need to avoid sentencing disparities between defendants convicted of similar conduct. Id., at (a)(6).
  • The need to provide restitution to victims. Id., at (a)(7).
  • The applicable sentence range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id., at (a)(4).

Three years ago the United States Supreme Court held that the Guidelines are advisory and federal district courts were not required to impose the precise sentence recommended by the Guidelines. See: United States v. Booker, 549 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). Two years later the Supreme Court overruled the longstanding legal premise that district courts had to apply a provision of the Guidelines that made one gram of crack cocaine the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes. See: Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558, 575 (2007).

In the wake of Booker, the Honorable Linda R. Reade of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa on November 21, 2005 sentenced James Eric Moore to a term of 188 months in confinement and six years of supervised release following a conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Moore had asked Judge Reade to impose a below-Guidelines sentence in light of the recent Booker decision. The judge replied: (more…)

August 28, 2008

FEDERAL SENTENCING: DISCRETION MAKES A COMBACK

Filed under: Federal Crimes Lawyer, federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , , — admin @ 2:43 pm

Following Booker, Kimbrough, Rita and Gall; District Courts Exercising Power to Sentence as Deemed Appropriate, Considering Case-Specific Factors, § 3553(a)

By: Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Senior Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Before 1984, criminal sentencing in federal courts was heavily criticized because of the disparate sentences imposed for similar conduct and because of the uncertainty as to the length of time offenders would actually serve in prison. But Congress changed all that with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Act was designed to produce a more even-handed determinate sentencing scheme. To accomplish this legislative objective, the Act imposed an absolute duty on federal district court judges to consider each of the seven sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), required federal judges to accept the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, and abolished the federal parole system as well. The end result of the Act, however, quickly proved to be even more draconian than hodgepodge sentencing practices it had replaced. Federal prison sentences grew longer because of the mandatory Guidelines, and because of the abolition of parole, longer stays in federal prison became the order of the day.

Three years ago the United States Supreme Court created a hope of relief when it declared unconstitutional the determinate sentencing provisions of the Act. See: United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). The court remedied the constitutional dilemma created by the mandatory nature of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines by holding that the Guidelines are only one factor federal judges must consider in sentencing. The court concluded the Guidelines are advisory and, therefore, federal judges have the discretion to impose a sentence more appropriate than one mandated by the Guidelines. Id., at 245-46.

Booker also ushered in a change in the way sentences are reviewed on appeal. It limited appellate review to a determination of whether a sentence is “reasonable” under the strict “abuse-of discretion” standard. Id., at 261. In cases involving sentences departing either up or down from the Guidelines, the appeal courts’ review the district court’s explanation for the departure is confined to a determination of whether the sentence is “reasonable” under a strict “abuse-of-discretion” standard. While an appeal courts may consider the “variance” and “extent” of departure, it cannot require that “extraordinary” circumstances exist to justify the departure or that district courts employ a rigid “mathematical formula” using a departure’s percentage as justification for a specific sentence. Applying these approaches, the Supreme Court said, would create an impermissible “presumption of unreasonableness.” Id. The court, therefore, concluded that the “abuse-of-discretion” standard should apply to all sentences, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the range of the Guidelines. Id.

In its last term, the Supreme Court handed down three significant decisions in its continuing effort to provide guidance through the labyrinth of the federal sentencing process. Those decisions are summarized below.

  • Kimbrough v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 558 (2007) – The court rejected the longstanding premise that federal district courts had to apply provisions of the Guidelines that effectively made one gram of crack cocaine the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine in sentencing determinations and instead held that those provisions are just one factor the sentencing court should consider as it attempts to fashion the appropriate sentence pursuant to § 3553(a). Id., at 575.
  • Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007) – The Court held that in cases involving sentences imposed within the range of the Guidelines, the appeals court may establish a “presumption of reasonableness” for those sentences and review them under the deferential “abuse-of-discretion” standard. Id., at 2465.
  • Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586 (U.S. 2007) – The Court held that sentencing decisions must be reviewed on appeal strictly under the deferential “abuse-of-discretion” standard, even when the appeals court determines that a different sentence is more appropriate. Id., at 597. (more…)

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