CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal Law Blog by Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

December 4, 2011

THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A BRADY VIOLATION

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , — johntfloyd @ 5:35 pm

Disciplinary Action against Rogue Prosecutors Who Intentionally Engage in Wrongful Conduct, Brady Violations Rare

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Among lawyers practicing criminal law, “Brady violation” is probably second only to a “Miranda warning” as the most recognizable legal term in this country’s jurisprudence; and, significantly, both of these U.S. Supreme Court decisions are designed to curb prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct. It’s an unfortunate commentary on our criminal justice system when these two important must be instructed by the highest court in the nation to obey the law and uphold our most cherished constitutional tenets: right to a fair trial and right to counsel.

As far back as 1908, when the American Bar Association adopted its Canons of Professional Ethics (“Canons”), prosecutors have been instructed that “[t]he primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.”

It is telling that more than a century ago the ABA felt the need to instruct prosecutors to do the obvious: obey the law. It is evident that the overseer of professional conduct of our Country’s legal system had witnessed enough misconduct by prosecutors before 1908 to feel the need to establish Canon 5 as “guidance” for prosecutors.

Twenty-seven years after the Canons were adopted the U.S. Supreme Court, in Mooney v. Holohan, was forced to inform prosecutors that the “knowing use” of perjured testimony to convict a criminal defendant violated “due process” of law. The Attorney General for the State of California had argued before the Court that the acts or omissions by a prosecutor could never rise to the level of a due process violation. The Court said that such a position would violate “the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.” Not stopping there, the Court added that the requirement of due process,

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December 1, 2011

BRADY VIOLATIONS IN WHITE COLLAR, CORRUPTION CONVICTIONS

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 7:18 pm

Serious, Widespread and Intentional Concealment of Evidence by DOJ and US Attorneys

By: Houston Criminal lawyer John T. Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Former Alaska lawmaker, Vic Kohring, has entered a guilty plea admitting he accepted bribes from an “oil man” for his help in keeping taxes low on the Alaskan oil industry.  The plea comes after an appellate court tossed out Kohring’s original conviction, along with others convicted in the scandal, after finding that the Government had intentionally withheld evidence in the trials.  Kohring’s case documents the years of scandal resulting from official corruption between the oil industry and Alaska’s politicians and the disturbing pattern of misconduct by prosecutors, hell bent on getting the bad guys, that followed.

Alaska State Rep. Victor Kohring was convicted in a federal court in 2007 on corruption charges that alleged he took bribes from oil industry insiders. He was sentenced to 42 months in prison and had served a year incarcerated before his case was reversed after a finding that the Government had intentionally mishandled the trials of the defendants.

One year after securing the Kohring conviction, federal prosecutors sought and secured a conviction of Alaska’s most powerful politician, Ted Stevens, who was the longest serving lawmaker in Washington at the time of his conviction in 2008. Despite his corruption conviction, Stevens barely lost his reelection bid just eight days later.

But, before his death in a plane crash in August 2010 at age 87, the former lawmaker would have vindication in the same federal court system which had convicted him. In April 2009 U.S. District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan reversed Stevens’ conviction at the behest of U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, telling the U.S. Justice Department (“DOJ”) that, “in 25 years on the bench, I have never seen anything approaching the mishandling and misconduct that I have seen in this case.” Adding that the misconduct of six DOJ prosecutors was so “shocking and disturbing” that the judge felt compelled to  appoint Henry F. Schuelke to investigate the egregious prosecutorial misconduct to determine if criminal charge should be brought against the prosecutors.

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November 12, 2011

SMITH V. CAIN: A LOOK AT PROSECUTOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE

ABA Files Amicus Demanding Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence Regardless of Materiality, Broader than Brady

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The Orleans Parish and Williamson County district attorney offices have something in common: both have a disturbing history of withholding exculpatory information that resulted in innocent men being sent to prison (or death row) for long periods of time (here, here and here). The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Smith v. Cain, is being asked by Juan Smith’s attorneys and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) to address a prosecutor’s pretrial ethical obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence. A “summary” of the ABA’s argument is outlined in its amicus curiae brief:

“The [Smith v. Cain] case involves numerous serious allegations of non-disclosure that, post-trial, a court must evaluate under this Court’s Brady jurisprudence. However, a prosecutor’s pre-trial ethical disclosure obligations, as governed by the attorney disciplinary rules of the state or jurisdiction in which the prosecutor practices, are separate from and broader than the constitutional standards. Specifically, the ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) [Model Rules of Professional Conduct] mandates disclosure of exculpatory and mitigating evidence without regard to materiality. This Rule’s widespread acceptance is reflected in the fact that 49 states, including Louisiana, as well as the District of Columbia, United States Virgin Islands, and Guam have adopted ethics rules that include a provision identical or substantially similar to it. Similarly, various provisions of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards promote broad disclosure of all exculpatory evidence, without regard to the materiality standard that is required for post-trial analysis under Brady. Accordingly, this Court should again recognize that a prosecutor’s pre-trial ethical disclosure obligations are distinct from the constitutional standards that control a court’s post-trial determination.”

In 1963, the Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland, held that a prosecutor under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has a duty to disclose favorable evidence to defendants upon request, if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Two decades later, in United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court redefined Brady by holding that a prosecutor’s duty to disclose material favorable evidence exists regardless of whether the defendant makes a specific request. The Bagley court defined “material favorable evidence” as any evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of the trial. In 1999, the Court, in Strickler v. Greene, held that a Brady violation occurs: (1) evidence is favorable when it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was either willfully or inadvertently withheld by the prosecution; and (3) the withholding of the evidence was prejudicial to the defendant.

Juan Smith was convicted of five counts of first degree murder and sentenced to life without parole in the Louisiana prison system. The convictions stem from a home invasion by a group of men in New Orleans in 1995 that left five people dead. Smith was the only person arrested and convicted for the crimes. The only evidence against him was an identification made by one of the surviving victims. His conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Following the denial of direct appeal, Smith’s Supreme Court brief explains what happened next:

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November 10, 2011

DEFENSE ATTORNEY PLACES ACADEMIC INTEREST BEFORE ETHICAL DUTY TO CLIENT

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , — johntfloyd @ 3:20 pm

Defense Lawyer Intentionally Failed to Comply with Longstanding Pleading Requirements in Death Penalty Writ

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

It is not our habit, nor is it in our nature, to second guess any strategy employed by a fellow defense attorney, unless that strategy is patently harmful to the client. The Hector Rolando Medina case is such a case—and it indeed begs public exposure. To understand this case we must first discuss the habeas corpus statute involved: Article 11.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Procedure in Death Penalty Cases), and the case law setting forth longstanding pleading requirements under the statute. A prerequisite to securing habeas corpus relief in a death penalty case requires the applicant to “plead specific facts” which, if proven true, might entitle him to relief. Thus, the initial burden rest with the habeas applicant to file a fact-specific petition, which raises issue(s) of constitutional magnitude; in other words, a constitutional violation which has harmed the applicant.

In October 2008 Medina was convicted in Dallas County of capital murder and sentenced to death. On his direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”), Medina argued he had been ineffectively represented during the punishment phase of his trial by his defense counsel. Without designating its opinion for publication, the CCA on January 12, 2011 affirmed Medina’s conviction and death sentence. The appeals court concluded: “By not specifying what evidence his counsel should have presented, the appellant has failed to present a basis to conclude that defense counsel’s decision not to present evidence was unreasonable, or that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.”

Medina then filed a habeas corpus application in the trial court pursuant to Art. 11.071, and the court appointed veteran criminal defense attorney R. Norris to represent the condemned inmate. Norris over his distinguished career of more than thirty-five years had previously represented between ten and twenty death row inmates. In all the habeas applications he filed for these condemned inmates, each application was supported by exhibits and well-pled facts in support of the legal issues presented in the applications.

However, for a reason we cannot fathom, Norris did not follow this standard practice in the Medina case. He told the CCA that he “did not think the law was settled that a habeas application must contain facts. He said he had thoroughly investigated the facts underlying his claims, but filed his pleading on the last possible day and refused the State’s offer to give him more time to replead and add those crucial facts.” The application Norris submitted to the CCA—what the court referred to as a “document” or a “non-application”—was “only four pages” that stated “mere … factual and legal conclusions” in support of a ten-point ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The CCA observed that Norris “intended to force this Court to readdress the pleading requirements, as he filed a thorough brief on that very issue in opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss the ‘application.’”

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November 8, 2011

MORE SHENANIGANS IN WILLIAMSON COUNTY DA’S OFFICE

DA Announces Policy of Hiding Brady, Potentially Exculpatory Evidence

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

We have become convinced that the only way the Williamson County District Attorney’s office will operate in a lawful and ethical manner is for the State Bar to assign an ombudsman to oversee its day-to-day handling of criminal prosecutions. The behavior of this office in the Michael Morton case has already triggered four investigations, including one by the State Bar (here and here). Grits For Breakfast recently carried yet another report, which was first reported by Wilco Watchdog, concerning allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. This time the misconduct charges involve Assistant District Attorney Tommy Coleman who withheld exculpatory evidence in a 2010 theft case.

Travis County attorney Amber Vasquez Bode was representing the theft case client. She told YNN that evidence was emailed to District Attorney John Bradley’s office three days before the end of her client’s trial. “They only give us the evidence that they hand us, we’re not given the file and copied it” Bode said. “In fact, we’re not allowed any copies of anything.”

When Bode learned about the withheld evidence, she questioned ADA Coleman about it, to which he replied: “It’s too late now, your guy already pled.” Bode’s said her client probably would have been acquitted had the evidence been timely disclosed.

When asked about the decision by ADA Coleman to withhold the emailed evidence, DA Bradley, according to YNN, said his assistant was following office “policy” not to disclose the evidence. A “policy decision” to withhold potentially exculpatory evidence! It is difficult for us to wrap our minds around a “policy” to send innocent people to prison rather than disclose evidence that could exonerate them.

“You can’t stack the deck, and you can’t hold back evidence, and those are fundamental principles that have to be adhered to,” attorney Vasquez said about the “policy.”

In a motion for a new trial, Vasquez said she became aware of the withheld evidence during discussions with jurors by her and Coleman after the conviction. Two jurors said they wished they had seen the evidence because “it would have most likely been exonerating.”

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November 6, 2011

POLICE POWERS PUT IN CHECK

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , — johntfloyd @ 3:30 pm

Recording Police Misconduct Protected by First Amendment

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Simon Glik was, and remains, a good citizen. He understands right from wrong no matter who the author of the wrongful action may be. So what he did on the evening of October 1, 2007 was a natural response of a good citizen. As he was walking past the Boston Common, he saw three of Boston’s finest arresting a young man. Moments later he heard a bystander exclaim, “you are hurting him, stop!” Glik, who was only ten feet away from the arresting officers, was concerned enough that the police were using “excessive force,” he began filming the incident on his cell phone.

The officers quite naturally did not appreciate a good citizen recording their questionable conduct. Once they got the young man in handcuffs, one of the officers turned to Glik, saying: “I think you’ve taken enough pictures.” Glik replied: “I am recording this. I saw you punch him.” One of the officers quickly passed the threshold of annoyance and escalated the confrontation with Glik into full-blown abuse of police power. He asked Glik if the cell phone recorded audio. Glik said that it did at which time the officer placed him in handcuffs. The officer informed Glik that he was being arrested for “unlawful audio recording” in violation of Massachusetts’ wiretap statute. After Glik was taken to the South Boston police station, the police there in the course of booking him took his “cell phone and a computer flash drive and held them as evidence.”

Boston police are apparently oblivious to having their misconduct “caught on camera.” Just last year a woman videotaped officers roughing up a 16-year-old teenager. The video captured police hovering around the teen as he lay on the ground while one of the officers punched him (here and here and here). You would think the Boston police would have learned something from the Glik, but apparently they didn’t.

The Boston police managed to get Glik charged not only with a violation of the wiretap statute but with disturbing the peace and aiding in the escape of a prisoner. The First Circuit Court of Appeal reported that the district attorney’s office voluntarily dismissed the aiding in escape of a prisoner charge which was followed by a February 2008 decision by the “Boston Municipal Court” dismissing the other two charges. The state court judge, as cited by the First Circuit, “noted that the fact that the officers were unhappy they were being recorded during an arrest does not make a lawful exercise of a First Amendment right a crime. Likewise, the court found no probable cause supporting the wiretapping charge, because the law requires a secret recording and the officers admitted the Glik had used his cell phone openly and in plain view to obtain the video and audio recording.”

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October 25, 2011

WHAT’S THAT: A “RUNAWAY” GRAND JURY!

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 1:35 pm

Harris County Grand Jury Probe focuses on HPD’s Breath-Testing Vans

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

This is our fourth post this year concerning out of control law enforcement “no refusal” DWI policies (here, here, and here). We don’t like them. They are at best, we believe, an unconstitutional invasion of individual privacy. Worse yet, they smack of the kind of things done in a police state—individual rights eliminated to protect the so-called “good of the majority.” The Harris County District Attorney’s Office is high on these no-refusal policies and the so called “no refusal holidays,” which were the obsession of former Assistant District Attorney Warren Diepraam. The DWI enthusiast has since taken his skills and DWI attitudes to the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office where he occupies the position of “chief” of the Vehicular Crimes Section.

Well, the “take no prisoners” legacy of Diepraam has fallen into some disfavor. The legacy began to unravel this past July when the Houston Chronicle carried a report that the Houston Police Department’s “breath-testing vans” (“BAT vans”) used in the no-refusal stops are defective and produce false positives for intoxication. Former HPD crime lab supervisor Amanda Culbertson and several lab technicians became so concerned about the flawed vans that they “documented” the problems—after which they resigned from the crime lab, apparently under fear of retaliation; something either HPD or the District Attorney’s Office was apparently concealing from defendants charged with DWI violations stemming from evidence produced by these “BAT” vans.

“We could no longer choose between a paycheck and our integrity,” the Chronicle quoted Culbertson as testifying this past July at a pretrial hearing in a DWI case being tried before District Judge Pam Derbyshire.

The problem with the BAT vans lies in their air conditioning systems which are needed to “regulate the temperature” of the breath testing machines used to measure breath alcohol levels. Culbertson told Judge Derbyshire that there was “an electrical glitch” which caused the machines to “reset” each time the van’s air conditioner was turned on. HPD was aware of this glitch and never fixed the problem. Culbertson and others were concerned about the “accuracy of the test results” produced in this unstable environment.

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October 21, 2011

“PROSECUTOR OF THE YEAR” FEELS THE HEAT

Williamson County Justice System under Scrutiny by State Bar of Texas

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Since our last post about the tragic case of Michael Morton, the “prosecutor of the year” in that case, now District Judge Ken Anderson, and his cohort, Mike Davis, who actually prosecuted Morton for the 1986 murder of his wife, face investigations by the State Bar of Texas and Morton’s attorneys, according to the Austin Statesman. The State Bar investigation is, as the newspaper accurately reported, a “rare step” by the Bar, as is the public acknowledgement that it has undertaken a disciplinary investigation against two of its members. Morton was freed from the state’s prison system on October 4, 2011 after serving 25 years for a murder he did not commit and on October 11, 2011 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals formally exonerated the man after DNA testing of a critical piece of evidence not only cleared Morton of the murder of his wife but identified the real killer as well.

Anderson and Davis, along with key law enforcement personnel, withheld critical evidence at Morton’s 1987 trial which almost certainly led to his wrongful conviction. For example, the prosecutors withheld the transcript of an interview with Morton’s mother-in-law who questioned the couple’s 3-year-old son shortly after his mother, Christine, was beaten to death with a “billy club.” The boy told his grandmother that he saw his mother beaten to death and that his father was not at home at the time of the murder. Other significant evidence withheld was a document disclosing that Christine’s credit card, which was in her purse and taken by her killer, was used in a San Antonio store, and another document showing that a check made out to Christine was cashed nine days after her death and the signature on it appeared to be a forgery.

While the prosecutors and law enforcement withheld this critical evidence and focused their sole attention on convicting Morton for murdering his wife, the real killer, who has only been identified as “John Doe” pending further investigation, was roaming the streets of Austin where he killed yet another woman in 1987—the same year Williamson County officials were wrongfully convicting Morton for the brutal murder of his wife.

Maureen Ray, who works in the office of the chief disciplinary counsel for the State Bar told the Statesman: “We decided, because of the high-profile nature of the thing, that we were going to tell the public that we were looking into it.”

Anderson is none too happy about either the State Bar’s investigation or the investigation by Morton’s attorneys into his handling of the murder case. Through his attorney Mark Dietz, the “prosecutor of the year” filed a motion contending that District Judge Sid Harle did not have “jurisdiction” to issue a subpoena in connection with the investigation being sought by Morton’s attorneys into “professional misconduct” accusations leveled against both Anderson and Davis.

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