CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal Law Blog by Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

February 10, 2012

THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , — johntfloyd @ 8:44 pm

Clergy Privilege Protects Communications Made In Confidence, Waived if Called as Character Witness

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

In a previous post, we outlined the case of Ernest “Randy” Comeaux, an inmate serving six life sentences for a series of rapes from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana. The background of the case can be found here. In November of 1998 Lafayette Police Department Captain James Craft received an anonymous telephone call that linked Comeaux to the rapes. Prior to his arrest, Comeaux reportedly spoke in confidence to an attorney and a priest—the only other persons who knew about the rapes, except Comeaux. We have already dealt at length with the attorney-client privilege implications in a case such as Comeaux’s. We now turn our attention to the clergy privilege implications.

The “clergyman-penitent privilege” has a long history in Texas. The Legislature in 1967 enacted Article 3715a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes which provided:

No ordained minister, priest, rabbi or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner of an established church or religious organization shall be required to testify in any action, suit, or proceeding, concerning any information which may have been confidentially communication to him in his professional capacity under such circumstances that to disclose the information would violate a sacred or moral trust, when the giving of such testimony is objected to by the communicant; provided, however, that the presiding judge in any trial may compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice.

This statute was effectively repealed in 1983 by the Texas Supreme Court when the court promulgated Rule 505 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Under Article 3715a the trial judge was vested with expansive authority to compel disclosure of a privileged clergy privilege. Rule 505 discarded this broad authority by providing:

(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious organization or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.

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February 4, 2012

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , — johntfloyd @ 8:09 pm

Special Rule of Privilege in Criminal Cases Provides Greater Protection to the Criminally Accused

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Ernest “Randy” Comeaux is currently an inmate serving six life sentences, without the benefit of parole, at the David Wade Correctional Center in Homer, Louisiana. The facts of Comeaux crime were detailed by a Louisiana Court of Appeals in the matter of Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Department on April 24, 2004:

“From the mid-1960’s until the moid-1990’s, a number of rapes occurred in the southern portion of Lafayette Parish and adjoining parishes which could not be solved. In late 1995, the Lafayette Police Department (LPD) developed a theory that the rapes were connected and could have been committed by the same person. In 1997, DNA testing revealed that semen examples from six rape scenes matched. At that point, LPD began looking for a serial rapist.

“In September 1997, a task force was formed to attempt to solve these related rapes. The task included LPD, LPSD (Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Department), Louisiana State Police, the FBI, and the University of Southwestern Louisiana, now University of Louisiana at Lafayette. Unsuccessful, the task force disbanded after approximately seven months. There were no new leads in the case until November 1998 when an anonymous caller suggested to LPD Captain James Craft that Randy Comeaux, a detective with the LPSD Juvenile Division, should be investigated for the rapes. DNA testing on the butt of a cigarette smoked by Mr. Comeaux revealed that his DNA matched semen samples from six rape scenes. After being arrested, Mr. Comeaux confessed to committing a number of rapes, including five rapes in Lafayette Parish.”

Comeaux was indicted and quickly pled guilty to six aggravated rape charges. The former detective was sentenced to six consecutive life sentences without the benefit of parole.

For purposes of this article, we will assume that prior to his arrest, Comeaux confided in two persons about his rapes: an attorney from whom he sought legal advice about the rapes and a Catholic priest to whom he confessed. These were the only two people who knew Comeaux was the Lafayette serial rapist. One of them apparently violated Comeaux’s confidentially by anonymously calling Captain Craft and telling him that Comeaux should be investigated for the rapes.  We will assume the anonymous call came from the lawyer, who was afraid that the rapes would continue until Comeaux was arrested.

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January 29, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVATE

Evidentiary Privileges in the American Legal System

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Writing in the Pittsburgh Law Review, University of California Law Professor Edward J.  Inwinkelried discussed in detail the history and legal parameters of evidentiary privileges. He opened his treatise with this observation: “From society’s perspective, the rules governing privileged communications, such as those between a client and his or her attorney are arguably the most important doctrines in evidence law.”

The importance of these doctrines can be measured by the fact that since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with evidentiary privilege law more than any other part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as pointed out by Professor Inwinkelreid.

The sources for Texas evidentiary privileges are grounded in the state’s Constitution, statutes, rules of evidence, or other rules established pursuant to statute. Rule 501 of the Texas Rules of Evidence defines an evidentiary privilege as a limitation on the admissibility of evidence. It is apparent that the Texas Rules of Evidence (Rules) do not favor privileges. They are viewed as harmful to evidence admissibility and therefore inhibit full disclosure of evidence; therefore, the Rules instruct trial courts to view claimed privileges with “close scrutiny.”

“Unlike almost all other rules of evidence, the rules creating privileges are not designed to enhance the truth-finding function of court proceedings…They acknowledge that other societal values such as privacy, the desire to encourage effective medical care or legal counsel, and governmental efficiency sometimes take precedent over the goal of ascertaining the truth in legal proceedings.”  Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook, Jones McClure Publishing, 7th edition, Cochran).

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January 26, 2012

CONDITIONS OF BAIL IN DWI CASES CAN BE HARSH

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , — johntfloyd @ 11:19 am

Politics and Profit Motive Lead to Unreasonable Conditions of Bond in First Time DWI Cases

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The Texas Legislature in 1999 gave courts the general authority to impose “reasonable conditions” of pre-trial release. This authority was codified in Chapter 17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 17.40(a) and has been used by some courts to impose draconian “conditions” of bond in DWI cases on the dubious claim they are related “to the safety of the community.”  Unfortunately, some courts, with pressure from tough on crime advocacy groups who often endorse judges during election cycles, have added such burdensome conditions of bond as to amount to punishment prior to a finding of guilt, disregarding the fundamental principle of “innocent until proven guilty.”

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ex parte Anderer, held that a court’s condition of bail will be upheld if it meets three criteria: 1) it must be reasonable; 3) it must be made to secure the presence of the defendant at trial; and 3) it must be related to the safety of an alleged victim or the community. At least one Court of Appeals, the Twelfth District in Burson v. State, held that the condition relating to safety of either victim or community does not necessarily need to relate to the other two criteria.

This authority to order conditions of release has been used to impose severe conditions in DWI cases, some of which, but not all, are listed below:

No driving while on bond;
Home curfew and electronic monitoring under Art. 17:43;
Home confinement, electronic monitoring and drug testing under Art. 17.44;
Installation of an ignition interlock (deep lung) device in any vehicle driven by the defendant under Art. 17.441;
No consumption of alcohol while on bond;
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January 5, 2012

“JUNK SCIENCE” ONCE AGAIN PUTS TEXAS IN NATIONAL FOREFRONT

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 5:31 pm

Defense Lawyers Need to Challenge Questionable Expert Testimony and Conclusions

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

In October 2010 we posted piece titled “Dog Witnesses Kicked Out of the Courtroom” concerning a capital murder case in San Jacinto County. The accused, all members of the same family—Richard Lynn Winfrey Sr. and his son, Richard Jr., and daughter, Megan—were arrested in 2006 for the brutal murder of Murray Wayne Burr, a longtime custodial worker at the high school attended by the Winfrey siblings. Local law enforcement officials considered Winfrey and his two children as “persons of interests” shortly after Burr was murdered in his home, even though DNA evidence found at scene excluded the Winfreys. The proverbial “break in the case” came in 2006 when Richard Sr., who was housed in the Montgomery County jail, told another inmate David Campbell that “some kind of gun and some kind of knife collection” had been taken from Burr’s home, as well as other details about the murder, including the victim’s body being dragged from one room to another. Campbell repeated this information to the authorities.

This new information spurred San Jacinto County investigators into action. Not deterred by the fact that the DNA evidence excluded the Winfreys, the police turned to what they believed was infallible science—the nose of specially trained dogs. They called in a renowned law enforcement bloodhound “expert” named Keith Pickett to conduct what is called a “dog scent lineup.” The lineup was conducted in 2007 at which time Pickett used three of his hounds: Quincy, James Bond, and Clue. Investigators provided Pickett with a scent sample from clothing worn by the victim on the night he was murdered and scent samples from six white males, including Richard Sr. All three dogs were “pre-scented” with the scent from the victim’s clothing. The dogs were then paraded past six paint cans containing the scent samples of the six white males. All three dogs “alerted” on the paint can containing Richard Sr.’s scent sample and later “alerted” on Richard Jr. and Megan’s scent sample as well. All three were tried and convicted of murder.

In 2009 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Winfrey v. State, threw out Richard Sr.’s conviction, saying the dog “scent” identification was insufficient evidence upon which to base a criminal conviction. The Texas Tribune reported on December 4, 2011 that Richard Jr.’s conviction has also been thrown out. Both men have been released from prison. And the Court of Criminal Appeals will soon decide Megan’s fate, most likely with the same result reached in other two Winfrey cases. She is now into her third year of a life sentence.

On December 15, 2011 the Texas Tribune also reported that the Court of Criminal Appeals had remanded two death penalty cases (Steven Butler and John Matamoros) back to the trial courts for review of the evidence used to determine they were “intellectually competent” to stand trial.

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December 28, 2011

WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Filing Grievances, Request for Courts of Inquiry in Wrongful Conviction and Exoneration Cases

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

On December 12, 2011, writing for Mother Jones, Beth Schwartzapfel and Hannah Levintova published a piece titled “How Many Innocent People Are In Prison?”—a piece based in part on research conducted by University of Michigan Law Professor Samuel Gross. Gross’s research, with the assistance of the New York-based Innocence Project and the Center on Wrongful Convictions, determined there have been as many as 850 exonerations in this country since the late 1980s. The Innocence Project lists 282 exonerations since 1989 based on DNA evidence alone. Extrapolating from these two figures, Schwartzapfel and Levintova conservatively estimate that 1 percent of the total prison population in the United States have been wrongfully convicted. Put it raw numbers, this means that approximately 20,000 inmates in the nation’s prison system were wrongfully convicted.

“We don’t even have a denominator,” University of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett told the Mother Jones writers. “But the wrongful convictions we do know about suggest that there’s a big problem.”

Writing in a 2008 paper titled Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction,” Gross reached the same conclusion as Garrett: “One difficulty in making generalizations about false convictions is that the ones we know about, exonerations, are clearly a small and unrepresentative sample of all false convictions.” Gross added that death penalty cases are the only ones in which false convictions can be accurately measured because they have trial transcripts. Gross’ 2008 paper reported that in the modern era the rate of exoneration is 2.3 percent in capital cases—and using this percentage, the Mother Jones writers reasonably extrapolated that there could have been as many as 87,000 wrongfully convicted people in the nation’s general prison population between 1989 and 2003.

Utilizing data compiled by Mother Jones, the Texas Tribune found, not surprisingly, that Texas leads the nation with 48 DNA exonerations and is third behind Illinois (95) and New York (83) with 78 total exonerations since 1989. In an article titled “No Country For Innocent Men,” which will appear in the Jan./Feb.2012 edition of Mother Jones, Beth Schwartzapfel found that 56 of these exonerations, including five death penalty cases, occurred under the reign of current Governor and presidential candidate Rick Perry, who still maintains that the criminal justice system is working. These figures are scary in light of the fact that 238 executions have taken place under Perry’s governorship—including Cameron Todd Willingham who, according to reputable fire forensic experts, was probably innocent of the arson murders of his three children in December 1991.

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December 20, 2011

HARDY V. CROSS: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE QUAGMIRED IN LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , — johntfloyd @ 1:37 pm

Confusing Logic from SCOTUS and Conflict Among Appellate Courts Leave Trial Courts Guessing The Meaning Of Confrontation

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The Sixth Amendment is one of the most important amendments of the United States Constitution. It ensures that an “accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with witnesses against him.” In 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Coy v. Iowa, observed that “it is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’” Just two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Court made this follow up observation: “[F]ace-to-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.” That observation is critically important because, as pointed out by the New York-based The Innocent Project, roughly 75 percent of the nation’s 282 DNA exonerations involved eyewitness misidentification.

Since the Confrontation Clause was forcefully made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court in 1965, in Pointer v. Texas, the Sixth Amendment has been a source of evolving, though conflicting, change in a long line of state cases. In an effort to resolve some of the conflict associated with Sixth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court in 2004 handed down Crawford v. Washington which held that a major underpinning of the Sixth Amendment is to prevent the admission of hearsay evidence because a criminal defendant cannot cross-examine what is called “out-of-court” testimony. Crawford clarified the difference between “testimonial” and “nontestimonial” hearsay evidence. Crawford specifically held that the use of testimonial hearsay violates a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights unless the individual making the hearsay statements is unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him/her. Non-testimonial hearsay, on the other hand, does not violate the Confrontation Clause and its admission would be determined by local rules of evidence. Crawford rejected the use of recorded statements given to the police by a wife incriminating her husband in a stabbing incident but who refused to testify against her husband by invoking the marital privilege (here).

Two years later, in Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court provided a more definitive clarification of testimonial evidence. Davis held that hearsay is testimonial when, under the “totality of the circumstances,” a law enforcement interrogation is part of an investigation into past events about a case and not in response to an “ongoing emergency.” Davis upheld the use of out-of-court statements made to a 911 operator during an emergency call for police assistance which implicated the defendant in domestic violence. Then, in 2009 the Supreme Court handed decided Giles v. California which involved the use of incriminating statements against a husband/accused given to the police by a wife several weeks before she was killed by the accused. Giles held that the incriminating testimonial statements of the deceased wife used against the accused violated the Confrontation Clause.

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December 17, 2011

THE IMPACT OF PINHOLSTER ON NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND BRADY VIOLATIONS

Federal Habeas Claims of “New Evidence” of Undisclosed Exculpatory Evidence Should be Remanded to State Courts

By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

In January 1982, Scott Lynn Pinholster, a California native, was an Aryan Brotherhood-type who, along with two like-minded cohorts, went to the home of a local drug dealer named Michael Kumar. The drug dealer was not at home when the Neo-Nazi trio arrived so they began to ransack the residence in search of drugs and money. At this inopportune time, two of Kumar’s friends, Thomas Johnson and Robert Beckett, arrived at the drug dealer’s home where they confronted the burglars. That confrontation led to Pinholster and his cohorts brutally beating and repeatedly stabbing Johnson and Beckett until they were dead.

The total net of the robbery was $23 and approximately a quarter ounce of marijuana. As the trio drove away from the scene, Pinholster reportedly said: “We got ‘em, man, we got ‘em good.”

Two weeks later one of Pinholster’s cohorts, Art Corona, surrendered to the police and named Pinholster as the mastermind of the Kumar residence robbery/double murder. Pinholster was arrested after which he threatened to have Corona killed if he did keep his mouth shut. The threat did little, if anything, to intimidate Corona who became the State’s key witness against Pinholster at his February 1984 trial. Two attorneys, Harry Brainard and Wilbur Dettmar, were appointed to represent Pinholster, but he rebuffed their representation and elected to represent himself—even though the prosecution had noticed him that it would seek the death penalty.

Pinholster testified in his own behalf during guilt phase of his trial. He admitted burglarizing Kuman’s residence and stealing some marijuana. He denied killing anyone, boasting to the jury that he was a “professional robber,” not a murderer, and insisting that during the hundreds of robberies he had committed during the previous six years he was always armed with a gun, not a knife. He also pointed the finger at Corona as the real killer of Johnson and Beckett.

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