High Court Misses Opportunity to Discuss Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors
By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair
For reasons we discussed in a previous post, the U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity in Smith v. Cain to discuss the ethical discovery obligations of both federal and state prosecutors—an idea strongly suggested by the American Bar Association in their amicus brief filed in the case. While the issue before the Court was whether Louisiana prosecutors had committed a Brady violation in a murder case by suppressing favorable evidence, the ABA had encouraged the Justices to use the case to emphasize that a prosecutor’s pre-trial ethical obligations to disclose exculpatory and mitigating evidence under Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3.09(d) in the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, are broader and distinct from the post-conviction Brady analysis. In its amicus curiae brief, the ABA framed the issue as follows:
“The case involves numerous serious allegations of non-disclosure that, post-trial, a court must evaluate under this Court’s Brady jurisprudence. However, a prosecutor’s pre-trial ethical disclosure obligations, as governed by the attorney disciplinary rules of the state or jurisdiction in which the prosecutor practices, are separate from and broader than the constitutional standards. Specifically, the ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) [Model Rules of Professional Conduct] mandates disclosure of exculpatory and mitigating evidence without regard to materiality. This Rule’s widespread acceptance is reflected in the fact that 49 states, including Louisiana, as well as the District of Columbia, United States Virgin Islands, and Guam have adopted ethics rules that include a provision identical or substantially similar to it. Similarly, various provisions of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards promote broad disclosure of all exculpatory evidence, without regard to the materiality standard that is required for post-trial analysis under Brady. Accordingly, this Court should again recognize that a prosecutor’s pre-trial ethical disclosure obligations are distinct from the constitutional standards that control a court’s post-trial determination.”
Although the Court reversed the conviction in Smith v. Cain, the Justices did not even mention a prosecutor’s pre-trial ethical obligations to disclose Brady material. It was an affront to the ABA. But we suspect, as we long have, that the Supreme Court is determined to provide as much ethical and constitutional cover for “rogue prosecutors” as possible. Put simply, the Court wants the status quo to remain in place; namely, that the worst consequence a prosecutor can expect for committing a Brady violation is a slap-on-the-wrist reversal of the conviction involved, as it did in Smith v. Cain.


