CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal Law Blog by Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

July 29, 2010

CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM: IMPROPER OR WRONGFUL CONVICTION?

Texas Forensic Science Commission Concludes Flawed Science Used In Trial That Led To Conviction and Execution

By: Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

It was December 1991 in Corsicana, Texas. Cameron Todd Willingham was alone in his residence with his three small children—Amber 2, and one-year-old twins, Karmon and Kameron. A fire broke out in the residence. Willingham managed to escape the fire. The three children did not, dying a horrible death trapped in the flames that quickly engulfed the residence. Willingham was immediately targeted as a suspect for arson murder. He was indicted on January 8, 1992. After turning down an opportunity to plead guilty for a life sentence, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in August 1992. He was executed on February 17, 2004, angrily telling all those present that he was an innocent man. The political and media fallout from Willingham’s execution began before his remains were laid to rest. The case’s controversial history can be found on Billy Sinclair’s blog here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here. But essentially Willingham was convicted and executed because state officials involved in the case—and with a lot of help from the condemned inmate himself—successfully portrayed him as a “monster” throughout the trial and execution process. The basis for this portrait was:

  • According to neighbors who witnessed the fire at the Willingham residence, he “crouched down” in his front yard and refused to make any effort to rescue his children from the fire despite repeated pleas by neighbors for him to do so. These statements, of course, influenced arson investigators at the scene of the fire to conclude Willingham must have had something to do with the fire.
  • When the fire blew out the windows of the house, Willingham reported hollered out concern about his car which was parked close to the residence. Witnesses said he jumped up, ran toward it, and moved it away from the house so it would not be damaged by the fire.
  • Willingham did not express any grief over the loss of his children at the fire scene or at the hospital after the fire.
  • Willingham reportedly expressed upset to firefighters at the scene that his dart board had been lost in the fire.
  • The morning after the fire, which was Christmas Eve, Willingham and his wife went to their burnt out house and were seen by neighbors laughing as they pored through the debris with loud music blaring from their nearby vehicle.
  • A neighbor testified that Willingham had once beaten his pregnant wife in an effort to induce an abortion, but his wife testified at the trial and disputed the neighbor’s claim by saying Willingham had never beaten her, much less when she was pregnant.
  • Another witness said he once saw Willingham slap his wife, but Willingham’s wife denied the incident ever happened.
  • Willingham reportedly bragged to a friend that he once brutally killed a dog.
  • Willingham reportedly told a “jailhouse snitch” that he killed his children to cover up evidence of abuse. Willingham’s wife, however, testified that her husband never abused the children.
  • Dr. James Grigson, a prosecution “expert,” testified at Willingham’s trial, telling the jury that Willingham was a violent sociopath who did not have a conscience and had no regard for other people’s property or for other human beings (even though there was nothing in Willingham’s criminal history to support this violent assessment).
  • In April 1986 Willingham was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and public intoxication. He was sentenced to four days in the county jail, and ordered to pay a fine and court costs.
  • In May 1986 Willingham was arrested for second degree burglary. He was placed on probation and assigned to a Non-Violent Intermediate Offender Act.
  • In May 1986 Willingham was again arrested: this time for entering a building with unlawful intent and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (supplying paint to a 12-year-old to sniff). He was sentenced to 15 days in the county jail, ordered to pay restitution, and placed on probation for six months.
  • In November 1986 Willingham was arrested for contributing to the delinquency of a minor (supplying paint to a 12-year-old and an 11-year-old to sniff). He was sentenced to 60 days in the county jail.
  • In April 1987 Willingham was arrested for grand larceny. He was sentenced to 60 days in the county jail and placed on two years probation.
  • In November 1988 Willingham was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs (sniffing paint). He was sentenced to one year probation on the condition that he would check into an in-patient rehabilitation program for paint abuse.
  • In February 1989 Willingham was arrested for shoplifting. His probations for the previous 1987 grand larceny and 1988 DUI convictions were revoked and he was placed in a special boot camp program, given a 2-year sentence with all but 74 days suspended on the conditions that 1) he complete a substance abuse program, 2) attend AA once a week, and 3) undergo urinalysis every week and a half.

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July 24, 2010

PSR OBJECTIONS OVER PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE

Filed under: federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , , , , — johntfloyd @ 1:48 am

Criminal Defense Attorneys Must File Objections to Pre-Sentence Report in Federal Criminal Cases to Protect Appellate Rights

By: Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The United States Congress, with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, established the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. These “Guidelines” not only guide but require U.S. District Court judges to consider all the sentencing factors Congress set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before imposing sentence in criminal cases. The U.S. Supreme Court in a series of cases has made it abundantly clear that the Guidelines are not mandatory but rather advisory in nature—a guide for the judge to utilize in crafting the appropriate sentence.

Prior to sentencing, Rule 32(c) (1) (A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a probation officer investigate the defendant and file a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) with the court. The defendant may not waive the report even with permission of the court. The PSR must contain the following information:

  • The history and characteristics of the defendant, including his/her criminal record, financial condition, and any other factors about defendant’s past behavior that may help the court fashion the appropriate sentence.
  • The offense level determined by the probation officer and criminal history category as determined by the Guidelines.
  • Impact of the crime on the victim.
  • The kinds of non-custodial programs available if appropriate for offense charged.
  • Defendant pays restitution where the law requires.
  • Any recommendations based upon a court-ordered study of the defendant.
  • Any other required information including § 3553(a) factors.

Rule 32(e) (1) prohibits the PSR from being disclosed prior to a determination of guilt following a trial or guilty plea. The PSR under Rule 32(e) (2) must be served upon all parties involved in the case at least thirty-five days before the sentencing hearing. Rule 32(f) requires the court to permit the defendant (and the Government) an opportunity to comment upon or object to the PSR, The defendant’s comments/objections must be timely filed. Rule 32(h) requires the court to notify the parties if it is considering departing from the Guidelines sentencing recommendation for reasons not identified in the PSR.

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July 13, 2010

WHEN NOT GUILTY DOES NOT MEAN INNOCENCE

Filed under: federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , , — johntfloyd @ 5:34 am

Monetary Damages Under § 2513, for Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment, Requires Showing of ‘Truly Innocent,’ Even After Acquittal

By: Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Robert E. Graham, a West Virginia native, was indicted by a Federal grand jury for 39 criminal offenses. It is not uncommon for the United States Government, armed with an arsenal of prosecutorial resources through the U.S. Justice Department, to overcharge criminal defendants. It is a tactic designed to force criminal defendants into unwanted guilty pleas or to overwhelm juries with so much documentary evidence that jurors will almost automatically vote “guilty” on the flimsy premise that the defendant must have done something wrong to face so many charges involving so much “evidence,” even if there is no factual basis for the evidence.

But Graham was not intimidated by the Government’s arsenal of weapons. He refused to plead guilty, waived his right to a jury trial, and forced the Government into a position of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a “bench trial” before a judge. The decision to indict and prosecute Graham was questionable at best—only prosecutors possessed with the power of arrogance would have sought and secured the indictment against him, especially on so many different charges involving essentially one criminal episode.

Graham was the executive director of two related non-profit groups: the Council on Aging, Inc. and All Care Home and Community Services, Inc. The two groups provided services to the elderly and infirm, and received more than $10,000 annually in federal funding. He had served as executive director of these two corporations for more than 20 years. His salary was $125,000 a year when hired in 1975. In 2001 his salary increased by the companies’ Board of Directors to $185,000. He did not have a written employment contract until his salary was raised in 2001.

In 2002, the Council on Aging agreed to assume administrative control of Graham’s contract, and, in fact, entered into an amended contract with him that provided a “sick leave” provision which allowed Graham to earn 16 hours of sick leave each month beginning with the date of his original employment and ending with termination of employment. The accumulated sick leave benefits could be converted into compensation if used for either illness or termination of the contract.

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July 9, 2010

A CHILD CANNOT BE BOTH CRIMINAL AND VICTIM

By: Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The Texas Supreme Court recently held that a child under the age of fourteen could not be found guilty of a Class B misdemeanor offense of prostitution. This case began when a 13-year-old identified by the court as B.W. waved over a Houston undercover police officer driving an unmarked vehicle and offered to perform oral sex on him for $20. The officer agreed, and as soon as the teenager got in the officer’s vehicle, he arrested her for prostitution. The case was originally brought in the criminal district court, but as soon as the District Attorney’s Office learned the girl was only thirteen, the criminal complaint was dismissed and charges were re-filed under Articles 51.02(2) and .04(a) of the Texas Family Code.

Normally, Article 8.07 of the Texas Penal Code prohibits criminal prosecutions committed by those under 15.  However, in crafting the juvenile justice system the Texas Legislature made a blanket adoption of the state’s Penal Code into its Family Code, which provides family/civil courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving juveniles between the ages of ten and seventeen. Article 51.03(a) (1) of the Family Code defines “delinquent conduct” as “conduct, other than traffic offenses, that violates a penal law of this state or the United States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail.” The legislative purpose for giving civil courts jurisdiction over children under the Family Code was explicitly stated in Article 51.01(3) which is to “provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children coming within its provisions.”

In Texas, children under the age of seventeen are legally unable to consent to sex with an adult.  Under Section 22.011 of the Penal Code, consensual sex between an adult and a person under 17 is defined as statutory rape.  It is a defense if the actor is not more than three years older than the child.  Sexual contact between an adult and a child under 14 is aggravated sexual assault, irrespective of consent.  Thus, a child under 14 can never, under any circumstances, consent to sex with an adult.  And this is where things turned flaky in B.W.’s case. The juvenile’s lawyers would argue that at age 13, if she could not legally consent to sex, she could not legally agree to consent to sex for a fee.

The Court summed up the issue this way: “In this case we must decide whether the Legislature, by its wholesale incorporation of Penal Code offenses into the juvenile justice provisions of the Family Code, intended to permit prosecution of a thirteen-year-old child for prostitution considering its specific pronouncement that a child under fourteen is legally incapable of consenting to sex with an adult.”

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July 6, 2010

A DEFENSE ATTORNEY’S NARROW MARGIN FOR ERROR

Filed under: Houston Criminal Lawyer — Tags: , , , , , — johntfloyd @ 5:21 pm

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Questions about Defendant’s Post Arrest Silence Opens Door to Cross Examination
By: Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions against them. The United States Supreme in 1984 handed down Strickland v. Washington which set forth the constitutional standard a criminal defendant must satisfy in order to establish that he/she was not effectively represented by their attorney. First, the defendant must prove that the defense attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and, second, the defendant must prove that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced his/her defense that the guilty verdict is unreliable and fundamentally unfair.

Every defense attorney walking into a criminal trial does so with the explicit understanding that his/her actions throughout the trial will be the subject to second-guessing should the result prove unfavorable to the defendant. That’s why the Supreme Court underscored the Strickland decision with the caveat to all state and federal courts reviewing ineffective assistance claims that a defense attorney’s tactical and strategical choices are presumed effective and insulated from second-guessing and hindsight. The Court specifically stated that “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”

Still, a defense attorney must recognize that he/she has a narrow margin for error. That’s what happened with the defense attorney who represented Wendell Keith White in a 1998 murder trial. In April of that year White went to Koach’s Club where a pool tournament was underway. One of the tournament’s contestants was Tracey Johnson who was at the club with a large group of friends, including Latasha Vasquez. At some point during tournament play Johnson stepped away from a pool table leaving her custom cue stick behind. Upon her return, Johnson found White using the cue stick without her permission and hitting it against the table. Enraged, she began cursing White before the bartender told her calm down and not to cause any trouble. White apologized to Johnson and bought her and her entourage drinks.

The club closed at 2:00 a.m. Shortly before closing time a sequence of events took place which were hotly contested by the parties involved. Johnson said White came up behind her and rubbed up against her as he grabbed her breasts. That groping incident triggered a second cursing outburst with Johnson calling White “just about every name in the book.” Although there was no physical contact between the two parties, one of Johnson’s friends had to restrain her by pulling her away from White. Johnson went outside in the parking lot where she was joined by a large gathering of friends.

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