CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal Law Blog by Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Mr. Billy Sinclair

October 30, 2008

DNA EXONERATIONS QUESTION EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

Flawed, Suggestive Photo Lineups Resulting in Eyewitness Misidentification and Wrongly Convicted

By: Houston Criminal Defense Attorney John T. Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The Dallas Morning News (October 2008) ran two articles written by Steve McGonigle and Jennifer Emily that linked 19 DNA exonerations to faulty eyewitness testimony. These two investigative reporters opened their series with the tragic story of Wiley Fountain who spent 15 years in the Texas prison system wrongfully convicted of rape:

“Wiley Fountain was the obvious choice among the six Polaroids police assembled for the rape victim to review.

“He was the only man wearing a dark baseball cap and light-colored warm-up suit, similar to what the attacker had on. He fit the rapist’s description ‘to a T,’ a Dallas police officer later testified. The victim was sure. Prosecutors believed her. So did the jury. But all of them were wrong.

“In September 2002, after Mr. Fountain had spent 15 years in prison, DNA testing proved his innocence. Today, he is free but homeless, scrounging for aluminum cans on the rugged streets of South Dallas.

“The story of his wrongful conviction and that of 18 others is lifting the curtain on criminal justice in Dallas County, which has led the nation in DNA exonerations since 2001. In every instance but one, a Dallas Morning News investigation found, police and prosecutors built their cases on eyewitness accounts, even though they knew such testimony can be fatally flawed.” (more…)

October 26, 2008

HEARSAY EVIDENCE, OBJECTIONS

Filed under: federal Appeals Attorney — Tags: , , — johntfloyd @ 2:45 pm

The Critical Need For Timely And Specific Objections During A Criminal Trial

By Houston Criminal Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

There is rarely a time when a defense attorney does not find the need to object during a criminal trial because the prosecution either attempts to introduce inadmissible evidence or engages in some questionable conduct concerning the proffer of evidence.

Tex. R. Evid. 103(a) (1) requires a timely objection to the admission or exclusion of questionable or irrelevant evidence. The objection must be accompanied by a specific reason for the objection. Id. See also: Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) [defendant must make a timely and specific objection each time inadmissible evidence is offered at trial and secure an adverse ruling from the trial court on the objection]; Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), however, relieves a defense attorney of the need to object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered if he either (1) requests a running objection or (2) objects to the evidence outside the presence of the jury. See, Geuder, 115 S.W.3d at 13.

These rules governing objections apply especially to hearsay evidence. See: Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Tex. R. Evid. 802 provides that inadmissible hearsay admitted at a criminal trial without objection by defense counsel does not lose its probative value because it is hearsay. Id.

This brings us to the tale of two cases involving hearsay evidence. Objection to this evidence was properly handled by one defense attorney but horribly mangled by another. We’ll examine the latter case first.

Francisco Vasquez was tried and convicted in June 2005 for the murder of Eduardo Cantu in 2004. The jury assessed punishment at 99 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See: Vasquez v. State, ___ S.W.3d ____, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 2952 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi April 24, 2008). (more…)

October 25, 2008

THE JUDICIAL WARS INVOKED BY CRACK SENTENCING

Supreme Court: Federal Judges Have Discretion at Sentencing

By Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, a federal district court judge must consider each of the factors prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing an appropriate criminal sentence. The § 3553 factors are:

  • “Nature and circumstances of the offense” and defendant’s “history and characteristics.” Id., at (a)(1). Under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence the sentencing judge is limited to those facts (1) “reflected in the jury verdict,” (2) admitted by the defendant, (3) contained in defendant’s guilty plea, or (4) reflect prior convictions. See: Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) [facts affecting sentence must be found by a jury].
  • The general purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act. Id., at (a)(2). The purposes of this Act are to have a sentence “(A) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (d) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner …”
  • The types of sentences available. Id., at (a)(3).
  • The policy statements of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Id., at (a)(5).
  • The need to avoid sentencing disparities between defendants convicted of similar conduct. Id., at (a)(6).
  • The need to provide restitution to victims. Id., at (a)(7).
  • The applicable sentence range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id., at (a)(4).

Three years ago the United States Supreme Court held that the Guidelines are advisory and federal district courts were not required to impose the precise sentence recommended by the Guidelines. See: United States v. Booker, 549 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). Two years later the Supreme Court overruled the longstanding legal premise that district courts had to apply a provision of the Guidelines that made one gram of crack cocaine the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes. See: Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558, 575 (2007).

In the wake of Booker, the Honorable Linda R. Reade of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa on November 21, 2005 sentenced James Eric Moore to a term of 188 months in confinement and six years of supervised release following a conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Moore had asked Judge Reade to impose a below-Guidelines sentence in light of the recent Booker decision. The judge replied: (more…)

October 18, 2008

THE PITFALLS OF DELAYED OUTCRY TESTIMONY

Hearsay Statements of Child Abuse Victims and Delayed Outcry

By Houston Criminal Defense Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

“Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of some matter being asserted. See: Tex. R. of Evid. 801. In English, hearsay is testimony about what somebody heard from somebody else. Hearsay testimony is generally inadmissible in a criminal trial. See: Tex. R. of Evid. 802. However, Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides an exception to the hearsay rule by allowing hearsay testimony in the prosecution of an offense committed against children twelve years of age and younger.

§ 38.072 is known as the “child outcry statute.” The statute applies only to statements made (1) by the child against whom the offense was allegedly committed and (2) to the first person to whom the child makes a statement about the offense providing that person is eighteen years of age or older. See: Sims v. State, 12 S.W.3d 499, 500 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d).

The appeals court in Brown v. State, 189 S.W.3d 382 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006) addressed the “outcry” issue at some length. The case involved a 10-year-old child victim who was sexually assaulted by a friend of her father. The child reported the sexual abuse to her father. The victim was subsequently interviewed, at the behest of investigating officers, by a counselor with the Child Advocacy Center. The victim told the counselor that the first two people she told about the sexual assaults were her father and the girlfriend of the defendant. She also said that she later told her brother, aunt, and uncle. Id., at 384. At trial she prosecution called the counselor as an “outcry” witness to testify and introduced a videotape of the counselor interview with the child victim during the counselor testimony. Id., at 385.

On appeal defendant argued that by allowing the counselor to testify and permitting the introduction of the videotape, the trial court had violated the “outcry” provisions of § 37.072. The appeals court agreed. It pointed out that the victim had made outcries to her father and the defendant’s girlfriend before speaking to the counselor. The State argued that the counselor was the proper outcry witness because the victim gave her a more detailed statement about the sexual abuse than she had the other two persons. The court rejected that argument, saying: (more…)

October 16, 2008

FABRICATION:

The Only Defense In Sexual Assault Cases Not Subject To Rebuttal Evidence, Keeping Extraneous Crimes, Wrongs, and Acts Out

By Criminal Defense Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

Writing in her book “The Cross-Examination of a Young Child in a Sexual Assault Case: Voice for the Defense” (Oct. 1999), Annabelle Hall said that jurors following a sexual assault trial involving a child raise the following questions:

  • Why would a child lie about sexual abuse?
  • How can a child know so much about sex if she has not been abused?
  • Would a child lie about sexual abuse?
  • Why would a child make the story up?

These questions clearly demonstrate why a defense attorney in a sexual assault case faces such a difficult task establishing a “fabrication” defense. A “fabrication” defense in a sexual assault case is premised on the theory that the victim has “made up” or deliberately lied about the sexual assault. As difficult as it may be to logically wrap the mind around this concept, reliable studies (including the U.S. Justice Department) have revealed that anywhere between 25 to 60 percent of all sexual assault allegations are false. Put simply, somewhere between one-quarter to one-half of the rape allegations leveled in this country are fabricated for one reason or another. Many involve child victims.

Why would a child lie about such a thing?

In Cross-Examination of Child Witnesses, presented at the 19th Annual Rusty Duncan Advanced Criminal Law Short Course in San Antonio, Texas (June 15-17, 2006), Houston criminal defense attorney Stanley G. Schneider and Dallas doctor Mark Blotcky partially answered this question:

“False allegations of sexual abuse are usually simply incorrect. They are initiated by parents or a third party, e.g., this occurs due to the hyper-vigilence [sic] of parents of young children after their parents have been sensitized by sensational news media coverage of sexual abuse scandals. Pediatricians and child mental health professionals by law also make reports to Child Protective Services of any ‘suspected’ child abuse without having to confirm its veracity. They may be acting perfunctorily and simply reporting abuse based upon a small amount of information provided by the mother, the child, or exhibited by the child’s physical or behavioral symptoms. I know clinicians who feel compelled to report even when they believe it’s highly improbable that abuse has occurred. They are practicing defensive medicine. The report itself may then become overly weighted “evidence,” as though there had been some real investigatory work done or an expert professional opinion rendered about the abuse, though the report is simply conforming to the law to report any suspected child abuse. Remember, very disturbed children, previously sexually abused children, bipolar children and others may exhibit eroticized behavior without being sexually abused. It is then easy to understand why a ‘third party’ makes a report.” (more…)

October 9, 2008

THE ACQUITTAL

THE ACQUITTAL

John Floyd Secures Not Guilty After Jury Trial, Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child younger than 14, 263rd District Court, Harris County, Case No. 1156699

A former Precinct 4 deputy accused of aggravated sexual assault of a child was found “not guilty” after three days of trial and six hours of jury deliberation. The State argued the defendant, in 2000, sexually assaulted an 11-year-old girl when he was a detention officer at the Harris County Juvenile Detention Center where the girl was detained.

After announcing their verdict, the jurors stated that they simply did not find the complaining witness’ testimony credible and accurate enough to convict the defendant for such a serious crime. The defense - led by John Floyd with the able assistance of co-counsel Chris Carlson and paralegal Billy Sinclair – presented the defense that the complaining witness’ sexual assault allegation was fabricated. This defense was supported by inconsistencies with other witness testimony and discrepancies in the prosecution’s evidence.

The prosecution supported its case with the 7-year delayed outcry testimony of the complaining witness and the testimony of a twice-convicted and currently jailed felon.

Bound by their oath to follow the law on the issue of “reasonable doubt,” jurors stated they simply could not attach any meaningful credibility to the prosecution’s case. In fact, one juror was so frustrated by the prosecution’s inept handling of the case that the juror posted a comment on the Houston Chronicle website that the prosecutor should have been jailed.

The not guilty verdict in this case follows a year of success for the John T. Floyd Law Firm in defending individuals falsely accused of sex offenses. Earlier this year, Mr. Floyd secured another not guilty, an acquittal by directed verdict, after a jury trial on charges of sexual assault in the 176th District Court of Harris County. Mr. Floyd also obtained a no-bill from a Harris County grand jury for an individual charged with sexual assault of a child in case number 111785 before the 184th District Court of Harris County, Texas. This was also a delayed outcry case. In August, Mr. Floyd obtained dismissals on two cases alleging indecency with a child, in cases 46527 and 46528, days before jury trial in the 400th District Court of Ft. Bend County, Texas. (more…)

October 6, 2008

A DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROFESSIONAL INDISCRETION

Prosecutor Hands Jury Sour Grapes After Not Guilty Verdict

By Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

The John T. Floyd Law Firm faced a recent difficult three-day trial in a Harris County courtroom. The District Attorney’s office had charged a defendant with aggravated sexual assault of a child. It was a classic delayed “outcry” case. The case was assigned to one of the very best prosecutors in sexual assault cases. She signaled early in the motion practice stage of the case that she would be a determined adversary willing to go to extraordinary lengths to secure a conviction against our client.

Faced with the natural bias against criminal defendants charged with such sexual offenses, the John T. Floyd Law Firm met the prosecutor’s frontal assault in the pre-trial process with fierce counter attacks. While our investigators located key witnesses and produced valuable documents and our paralegal pursued relentless legal research, the trial attorneys pursued discovery and formulated an aggressive “take no prisoners” fabrication defense. At trial, the defense attorneys focused on the primary objective: convince the jury that the prosecution’s case, from top to bottom, was not credible without opening the door to any damaging rebuttal evidence on the fabrication defense.

The jury got the case on a Wednesday morning at 10:30 a.m. By 11:30 a.m., and after the jury had requested to review a piece of evidence, it was evident that the prosecution had not secured its normal “quick” guilty verdict. The jury had questions. Questions meant doubt. Doubt meant the prosecution had not immediately closed the deal on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Twice more by 2:30 p.m. the jury asked to review portions of certain testimony. The prosecution team grew nervous. They fidgeted and engaged in “pass the time” conversations in the courtroom. Uncertain, hollow laughter emanated from their group discussions. Unconsciously, they got up and moved about the courtroom which had long emptied of the hustle and bustle of the routine guilty pleas entered earlier in the day. The “expert” child sexual assault prosecutor betrayed her obvious concern with defensive body language and constant need to get up and move about.

Then at 4:30 came the two rings of the bell signaling that the jury had reached a unanimous verdict. The defense team quickly assembled and moved back to the defense table with their client. They were cautiously optimistic. The trail signs indicated at a minimum a “hung jury” decision but now there was a real possibility of a “not guilty” verdict. They dared not speak the latter hope. Never tempt the hand of fate. Let fate chart its own course. Hope leads to raised expectations, and raised expectations can so easily crash against the sea wall like a violent incoming wave. (more…)

October 4, 2008

DOES CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE LEAD TO FUTURE MENTAL ANQUISH?

By Houston Criminal Defense Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

If you were raped at age nine by your local YMCA counselor, do you think you would endure what is known in legal parlance as “future mental anguish?”

At least one Texas court of appeals did not think so: the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas.

The case originated in San Antonio. The local YMCA owns and operates a summer camp called Camp Flaming Arrow (CPA). The parents of a nine-year-old boy enrolled their son into CPA’s summer program. Beginning in 1998, CPA employed a counselor named Kenneth Trimble. In the Spring of 2000 YMCA learned that Trimble had been arrested for sexually molesting 20 children at CPA during his two-year employment. One of those was nine-year-old “Adam Adams” (a court-designated name). Trimble confessed that he had “sexually inappropriate contact” with young Adam. See: YMCA v. Adams, 220 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007). The court of appeals described that “sexually inappropriate contact” as follows:

“A. A. testified that one night he awoke screaming and Trimble went over to check on him but got into his bed and was bumping him. Both A. A. and Trimble were fully clothed. Apparently, this was the only incident occurring between A. A. and Trimble.” Id., at 3.

Adam’s parents sued the YMCA under the theory that its negligence in hiring, retaining, and supervising Trimble caused Adam’s injury. A civil jury returned a verdict with the following findings:

Trimble intentionally and knowingly caused serious mental impairment or injury to Adam;

YMCA’s negligence caused the injury;

Responsibility for the injury should be apportioned 95% to Trimble and 5% to YMCA; and

While Adam sustained no past mental anguish, he would probably sustain $500,000 in future mental anguish damages.

(more…)

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